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ABSTRACT
Local differential privacy (LDP) enables private data sharing and analytics without the need for a
trusted data collector. Error-optimal primitives (for, e.g., estimating means and item frequencies)
under LDP have been well studied. For analytical tasks such as range queries, however, the best
known error bound is dependent on the domain size of private data, which is potentially prohibitive.
This deficiency is inherent as LDP protects the same level of indistinguishability between any pair of
private data values for each data downer.
In this paper, we utilize an extension of -LDP called Metric-LDP or E-LDP, where a metric E
defines heterogeneous privacy guarantees for different pairs of private data values and thus provides a
more flexible knob than  does to relax LDP and tune utility-privacy trade-offs. We show that, under
such privacy relaxations, for analytical workloads such as linear counting, multi-dimensional range
counting queries, and quantile queries, we can achieve significant gains in utility. In particular, for
range queries under E-LDP where the metric E is the L1-distance function scaled by , we design
mechanisms with errors independent on the domain sizes; instead, their errors depend on the metric
E, which specifies in what granularity the private data is protected. We believe that the primitives we
design for E-LDP will be useful in developing mechanisms for other analytical tasks, and encourage
the adoption of LDP in practice.
1 Introduction
After more than a decade of research and development, differential privacy (DP) [20] has become the de facto standard
for privacy protection, and is being used or actively explored by major companies in various data applications and
services, e.g., Apple [39], Google [22], Uber [28], Microsoft [16], and Alibaba [42]. This privacy guarantee allows
releasing aggregate information of the population while protecting individual’s data. The degree of protection is
characterized by a parameter , which is used to tune a trade-off between the level of privacy protection and the error of
data analytics.
Two models of DP have been studied: centralized differential privacy (CDP) and local differential privacy (LDP). In
CDP, a trusted centralized data curator receives data from data owners and ensures a differentially private data release
to mistrustful data analysts. In LDP, there is no trusted data curator; each data owner perturbs her data locally and sends
the noisy output (LDP report) to the curator.
Recently, LDP has received a significant amount of attention in the real-world deployments of DP [22, 16], as it prevents
single-point failures for data breaches and relieves the burden on the data curator to keep data secure. For primitives
such as frequency estimation, a sufficient number of data owners and their LDP reports (e.g., refer to lower bounds in
[9, 18]) are required to achieve high utility. In more useful tasks such as range queries, more error has to be introduced
with additional terms that depend on the domain size and the dimensionality. Improving the utility for queries on
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datasets with large domain sizes and dimensionalities, where the additional error terms are prohibitive, has been the
research focus of LDP algorithms [14, 38, 43, 46], to encourage the adoption of LDP.
In many applications, LDP is too strict and not flexible, as not all pairs of values require the same level of protection.
For instance, when website visits are collected, the website type, e.g., shopping or video website, is less sensitive
than the particular website, YouTube or Hulu, or video being visited; when a person’s age is collected, whether s/he
is an adult or a kid is less sensitive than the exact year or month of birth. Such relaxations have been formalized as
Blowfish [27] and dX -privacy [10] in CDP, and geo-indistinguishability [3] and Metric-LDP [2] in LDP. In fact, we can
show that these notations are equivalent in terms of how privacy is relaxed.
In this paper, we utilize Metric-LDP [2], which has a metric function defining different levels of privacy requirements
for different pairs of values. We study how to make the best of such privacy relaxations to optimize utility-privacy
trade-offs and to achieve provably significant utility gains for analytical tasks. We first consider the tasks of linear
counting and range counting queries under Metric-LDP. For multi-dimensional range counting queries and a concrete
class of metric, we introduce a novel mechanism whose error is independent on the domain sizes of dimensions. It
achieves significantly better utility than the best known -LDP algorithms [14] and [42], whose error is prohibitive when
the domain sizes and dimensionality are non-trivial under -LDP. Our algorithms can be applied as primitives in other
tasks such as quantile queries for provable utility gains. There were no known algorithms utilizing such relaxations to
gain utility for multi-dimensional range queries in the local model. For the equivalent relaxation in CDP, the best-known
utility gain [26] (under Blowfish [27]) is much less significant than ours (relatively).
1.1 Preliminaries
Let X denote the domain of private values. Suppose there are n data owners, each holding a private value x ∈ X . A
data collector wants to collect these private values from data owners to conduct analytical tasks. In the local model of
differential privacy (LDP), a data owner does not trust the data collector; she encodes her private value x locally with
a randomized algorithm A, and sends the LDP report A(x) to the data collector. LDP formalizes a type of plausible
deniability: given any output A(x), the likelihoods to generate A(x) with A from x and from any other value are
approximately the same.
Definition 1 (Local Differential Privacy [17, 19]). A randomized algorithm A : X → Y is -locally differentially
private (or -LDP), if for any pair of private values x, x′ ∈ X , and any subset of output S ⊆ Y , we have that
Pr[A(x) ∈ S] ≤ e · Pr[A(x′) ∈ S].
Local differential privacy on metric spaces. -LDP guarantees the same level of protection for all pairs of private
values. However, such homogeneous privacy definition may be too strong for many applications. We adopt an extension
of LDP called Metric-LDP [2], which uses a metric function to customize heterogeneous (different levels of) privacy
guarantees for different pairs of private values and to tune utility-privacy trade-offs in analytical tasks.
Definition 2 (Metric-based Local Differential Privacy [3, 2]). Let E : X × X → R≥0 define a metric function on the
input domain. A randomized algorithm A : X → Y satisfies Metric-LDP or E-LDP if for any pair of values x, x′ ∈ X
and any subset of output S ⊂ Y , we have that Pr[A(x) ∈ S] ≤ eE(x,x′) · Pr[A(x′) ∈ S].
Here, smaller E(x, x′) implies that it is more sensitive to the data owners whether the private value is x or x′. Similar
to DP and LDP, E-LDP also has the sequential composability.
Relationship to other relaxations. Metric-LDP is a generic form of Blowfish [27] and dX -privacy [10] adapted to
the local model. In particular, Blowfish introduces the concept of policy graph, where each vertex corresponds to a
data value and the distance between two vertices measures how strong the protection between the two corresponding
values is (the smaller the stronger). Indeed, distance on graphs is a metric. One attempt to further generalize the
relaxation is to consider an arbitrary function E : X × X → R≥0, instead of restricting E to the class of metric
functions. In fact, it is sufficient to focus on the function that define a metric on X . Suppose a randomized algorithm A
is E-LDP. The function E is said to be tight for A, if there do not exist x, x′ ∈ X , S ⊆ Y , and a < E(x, x′), such that,
Pr[A(x) ∈ S] ≤ ea ·Pr[A(x′) ∈ S]. It is worth noticing that for any algorithmA that isE-LDP andE is not tight, there
exists another tight function E′ which A satisfies, and E′ is stronger than E, i.e., ∀x, x′ ∈ X : E′(x, x′) ≤ E(x, x′)
and ∃x, x′ : E′(x, x′) < E(x, x′). Therefore, it is sufficient to investigate the family of functions that are tight.
Formally, we have Proposition 1 (with proof in Appendix A.1).
Proposition 1. Any tight function E for an algorithm A defines a metric on X .
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1.2 Problem Statement and Our Main Results
Each of the n data owners holds a private value xi ∈ X , and let X = {xi}i∈[n] be the whole private dataset. An
analytical task q(X) is to be conducted on X by the data collector.
We focus on single-round LDP mechanisms in this work. With E-LDP reports Xˆ = {A(xi)}i∈[n] collected from data
owners, the data collector wants to estimate the answer to q(X) as qˆ(Xˆ) from Xˆ . The privacy is guaranteed on each
LDP report A(xi), and thus, we do not need to worry about privacy in designing the estimator qˆ as it can be regarded
as “post-processing” of LDP reports. A and qˆ often need to be co-designed, as a mechanism, for an analytical task.
Previous work [3, 2] define utility loss as the hardness of reconstructing the real data distribution from LDP reports,
represented as the expected difference between the statistical properties based on LDP reports and those based on
the real data. However, for a concrete analytical task, there is no guarantee on estimation errors for the algorithms in
[3, 2]. An important contribution of our paper is that, for several tasks, we propose mechanisms that achieve provable
end-to-end utility (error bounds) under Metric-LDP.
Linear counting (Section 3). Let’s consider a finite domain X = [m]. An indicator 1P is defined to be 1 if the
predicate P is true, or 0 if otherwise. The frequency vector on the dataset X is c = [cx]
ᵀ
x∈[m], where cx =
∑n
i=1 1xi=x
represents the number owners holding a private value x. A linear counting task q(X) is specified by a q ×m workload
matrix W with q rows, and asks for W · c. In particular, each row of W is a linear counting query asking for a linear
combination of frequencies. We use the total expected squared error, E[‖qˆ(Xˆ)−W · c‖2], to measure the utility of an
estimation (the expectation is taken over the randomness of n instances of A).
As warm-up, for this class of counting queries, we introduce a mechanism to minimize the above error based on a
generic matrix formulation, which is a reminiscence of the class of matrix mechanisms, [31, 32, 33] and [26], under
CDP. Here, we need to carefully model the flexibility introduced by Metric-LDP to optimize the utility, i.e., allowing
noises of heterogeneous magnitudes to be added at each dimension of the data. This mechanism can be applied for
answering one-dim range counting queries with a provable error bound.
Multi-dimensional range counting (Section 4). Let’s consider a D-dim domain X = [m]D, and each data owner i
has a private value xi ∈ X = [m]D. A D-dim range query is specified by an interval R = [l1, r1] × . . . × [lD, rD],
asking for
∑n
i=1 1xi∈R. We want to bound the expected squared error for a given range query.
A metric EL1 on X = [m]D is defined based on the L1-distance: EL1(x, y) = ‖x− y‖1 = 
∑D
i=1 |x[i]− y[i]|. For
any given multi-dimensional range query on [m]D, we introduce an EL1 -LDP mechanism with expected squared error
bounded by O(n( 22 )
D), which completely removes the dependency on the domain size m in error. Our algorithm can
be extended for weighted range queries.
In comparison, the best known -LDP algorithms [14, 42] for multi-dimensional range queries have error O(n log
2Dm
2 ).
EL1 is equivalent to the policy graph under Blowfish adopted by Haney et al. [26] for answering range queries in the
centralized setting. The techniques in [26] can be extended to the local model, leading to the best previously known
error bound O(nD(logm)
2(D−1)
2 ) under EL1 -LDP.
Our algorithm replaces the term log2Dm (in previous works) with 1/2D in the error bound. As  is usually chosen
to be a constant no smaller than 1 for reasonable utility in data analytics under LDP, especially in the real-world
deployments, e.g.,  ≥ 1 in [16] by Microsoft and  ≥ 4 in [39] by Apple, we have 1/  logm and thus obtain a
significant utility boost from the privacy relaxation.
Quantile queries (Section 4.4). We consider quantile queries in a one-dim domain X = [m]. We defer the formal
definitions of quantile queries and their errors to Section 4.4, where we will apply our algorithm for range queries as a
primitive to answer quantile queries with provable accuracy gain under EL1 -LDP.
2 Related Work: Privacy Notations and Primitives
Generalized privacy notations. There are several orthogonal lines of efforts that generalize or relax different aspects of
the notation of differential privacy under the centralized setting. The first line of work is to generalize the quantification
of the privacy loss, i.e., the divergence between the output distribution of an algorithm on neighboring datasets that
differ in a record. Examples are KL-[44], Renyi-[36] differential privacy, and capacity bounded differential privacy [12].
These generalizations aim to achieve tighter privacy composition properties than the standard differential privacy.
The second line of work consider semantic privacy frameworks which (i) clarify assumptions on the adversary and
3
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(ii) redefine sensitive information to be kept secret, such as Pufferfish privacy [29, 30] and membership privacy [34].
Specifying a weaker version of adversary under a semantic framework [34, 40] or weaker protection on the sensitive
information [27, 26] allow the design of algorithms with better utility than the standard differentially private algorithms.
For example, Blowfish privacy [27] restricts the properties of an individual (from “any pair of tuples”) that are sensitive
and should not be inferred by the attacker, which are specified as a policy. [27] shows improved utilities for several
tasks including k-means clustering, estimating cumulative histograms, and range queries. Readers can refer to a recent
survey [15] on DP for other variants under the centralized setting.
Under the local setting, MetricLDP is a direct extension of dX -privacy [10, 2] from the centralized setting. It defines
different privacy levels for every pair of values x, x′ ∈ X , allowing them to become more distinguishable, by a factor at
most e·dX (x,x
′), as their distance dX (x, x′) increases. In the context of location privacy, dX is the geographical distance,
and an instance of dX -privacy and MetricLDP is called geo-indistinguishability [3, 11], which protects the location of
the user during the interaction with location-based services. Geo-indistinguishability (as well as dX -privacy) can be
implemented via the Laplacian mechanism, and is adopted as a component in privacy-preserving mobile applications,
including LP-Guardian [24], and LP-Doctor [23]. A similar notion called Condensed Local Differential Privacy is
proposed in [25], with empirical studies on several task such as frequency estimation, heavy hitter identification, and
pattern mining. Another related work proposes Utility-optimized LDP [37] that protects only sensitive data with a
privacy guarantee equivalent to LDP, and studies two mechanisms named utility-optimized randomized response and
utility-optimized RAPPOR under such privacy definition.
In terms of the utility measurement, [3, 2] define utility loss as the hardness of reconstructing the real data distribution
from LDP reports, represented as the expected difference between the statistical properties based on LDP reports and
those based on the real data. However, for a concrete analytical task (e.g., those in Section 1.1), there is no guarantee on
estimation errors for the algorithms in [3, 2], and it is unclear how to measure the utility following the definitions in [2].
An important contribution of our paper is that, for several tasks including linear counting queries and range queries, we
propose mechanisms that achieve provable end-to-end utility gain under reasonable metric functions.
Shuffle model. Orthogonal to the relaxation of privacy notations is a recent line of work [7, 13, 21, 4] connecting LDP
to the centralized model by patching an 0-LDP algorithm with a trusted shuffler who randomly shuffles LDP reports
from n data owners (e.g., using an anonymous communication channel). If 0 is small, the shuffling step amplifies the
privacy guarantee to be (, δ)-DP, where  = O(0/
√
n). Such privacy amplification implies accuracy boost, because
for a reasonable privacy budget, e.g.,  = 2, it allows LDP algorithms to use a larger 0 to achieve better accuracy.
Primitives under LDP. Finally, we give a brief summary on the analytical primitives under LDP (without relaxation).
Mean/median estimation under -LDP has been well studied [17, 18, 16] with a matching upper and lower bound.
Frequency estimation under LDP is also studied extensively in, e.g., [19, 22, 6, 16, 5, 41, 1]. They use techniques
like hashing (e.g., [41]) and Hadamard transform (e.g., [5, 1]) for good utility. Consistent frequency estimation
which requires the estimations to be non-negatives and sum up to 1 is investigated in a recent work [43]. For locally
differentially private range queries, the work of [14, 42, 46] present the state-of-the-art. One goal of this paper is to
achieve better utility in such analytical primitives via relaxation and tuning the knob of metric function.
3 Frequency Estimation and Linear Counting Queries
We first consider the task of answering linear counting queries, defined in Section 1.2: how to collect each private value
in X under E-LDP, and estimate W · c for a given workload matrix W.
A straightforward framework for answering linear counting queries is to first estimate the frequency vector as cˆ from
E-LDP reports Xˆ = {A(xi)}i∈[n], and return W · cˆ. Assuming the estimation is unbiased, i.e., E[cˆ] = c, with the goal
of minimizing the total expected squared error, we want to minimize E[‖qˆ(Xˆ)−W · c‖2] = Trace(WᵀW ·Var[cˆ]).
There are two remaining questions: i) how to estimate the frequency vector under E-LDP; and ii) how the metric
function E can help gain utility in this framework. We give a matrix formulation next to answer these two questions.
3.1 A Generic Matrix Formulation under Metric-LDP
The class of matrix mechanism has been well studied in the centralized setting of differential privacy, to reduce the
variance for estimating a workload of linear counting queries [31, 32, 33]. Haney et al. [26] establish an equivalence
relationship between Blowfish privacy for answering linear counting queries and standard -differential privacy for
answering transformed linear counting queries, under some policies. We show that under E-LDP, a similar mechanism
can be formulated.
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The intuition behind matrix mechanisms in the centralized setting [31, 26] is that, instead of answering a workload W
with high sensitivity, the data collector can answer a properly chosen strategy workload A with low sensitivity, and
then reconstruct the answers for the workload W. For the local setting, we can generalize the above idea by asking
each data owner to prepare the E-LDP report according to the strategy workload A instead of the actual W. Then the
data collector reconstruct the answers for W via linear transformations. A properly chosen strategy matrix may lower
the amount of noise to be injected to the E-LDP reports and thus improve the utility.
E-LDP encoding algorithm AA,B,s(x). More formally, every data owner uses the same p × m strategy matrix
A = [a1 . . .ap]
ᵀ. Every row of the workload matrix W can be reconstructed using a linear combination of rows of A.
That is, there exists matrix decomposition W = BA for some q × p matrix B. Each data owner first encode her value
x as a length-m binary vector hx = [0, ..., 0, 1, 0, ..., 0]ᵀ where only the x-th position is 1. We use Lap(s) to represent
a random sample drawn from Laplace distribution with parameter s. Each data owner draws p independent random
samples Lap(s) = [Lap(s1), . . . ,Lap(sp)]
ᵀ, with parameters s = [s1, . . . , sp]ᵀ, and reports:
AA,B,s(x) = A · hx + [Lap(s1), . . . ,Lap(sp)]ᵀ = A · hx + Lap(s).
Proposition 2. AA,B,s is E-LDP, if for any pair of x, x′ ∈ [m], we have[
1
s1
1
s2
· · · 1sp
]
|A(hx − hx′)| ≤ E(x, x′),
where |A(hx − hx′)| =
[|aᵀ1(hx − hx′)| · · · |aᵀp(hx − hx′)|]ᵀ, namely, |A(hx − hx′)| is the vector obtained by
taking the absolute values of entries in vector A(hx − hx′).
Proof. To show AA,B,s satisfies E-LDP, we just need to show
Pr[AA,B,s(x) = r]
Pr [AA,B,s(x′) = r] =
p∏
i=1
exp(− |r[i]−A·hx[i]|si )
exp(− |r[i]−A·hx′ [i]|si )
≤
p∏
i=1
exp(
|A(hx[i]− hx′ [i])|
si
)
= exp
(
p∑
i=1
|A(hx[i]− hx′ [i])|
si
)
≤ eE(x,x′),
from the condition in the proposition.
Answering linear counting workload. After collecting Xˆ = {ri = AA,B,s(xi)}i∈[n] from n data owners, the data
collector estimates the linear counting queries W · c as B ·∑ni=1 ri.
Proposition 3. The estimation qˆ(Xˆ) = B ·∑ni=1 ri is an unbiased estimation of W · c. The variance (total expected
squared error) of the estimation qˆ(Xˆ) is
E[‖qˆ(Xˆ)−W · c‖2] = 2n · Trace[BᵀB · diag(s21, . . . , s2p)]
where diag(s21, . . . , s
2
p) is a p× p diagonal matrix with diagonal elements s21, . . . , s2p.
The proof of this proposition is in Appendix A.2.
If we set A = Im (m ×m identity matrix) and B = W, then
∑n
i=1 ri is an unbiased estimation of the frequency
vector c. In general, we can choose A and B properly based on the workload W and the metric E to gain utility, which
is formulated as the following optimization problem.
An optimization problem. Given a workload W and a metric E, we want to choose A, B, and s = [s1, . . . , sp]ᵀ to
minimize the total expected squared error on the workload W:
min
A,B,s
2n · Trace[BᵀB · diag(s21, . . . , s2p)]
s.t.
[
1
s1
1
s2
· · · 1sp
]
|A(hx − hx′)| ≤ E(x, x′), ∀x, x′ ∈ [m]
BA = W
sk > 0, ∀k ∈ [p]
(1)
where |A(hx − hx′)| =
[|aᵀ1(hx − hx′)| · · · |aᵀp(hx − hx′)|]ᵀ.
It is hard to solve (1) efficiently, unless A is fixed (then it becomes convex but a bad choice of A may lead to a
suboptimal solution). In the rest of this section, we will consider several specific workload matrices W and metric
functions E that have interesting usage in practice and admit efficient solutions.
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3.2 Minimizing Total Error in Frequency Queries
When the workload matrix W = Im (an m×m identity matrix), the problem becomes estimating the frequencies of
all private values. We choose both A and B in (1) to be Im. The E-LDP encoding algorithm AA,B,s(x) introduced
above, parameterized by s, becomes a metric-based extension of the histogram encoding mechanism introduced in [41]
for constructing the frequency oracle under -LDP. And accordingly, the optimization problem (1) becomes a convex
and solvable special case:
min
s
2n ·
m∑
x=1
s2x
s.t.
1
sx
+
1
sx′
≤ E(x, x′), ∀x, x′ ∈ [m]
sx > 0, ∀x ∈ [m].
(2)
We can achieve better utility under E-LDP than standard -LDP by solving the optimization problem (2) for non-trivial
metric functions. Let’s look at such a family of metric functions ES , parameterized by S ⊆ [m], which denotes the set
of super sensitive values [m] (while values [m]− S are less sensitive). More formally, let ES(x, x′) =  if x ∈ S or
x′ ∈ S, and ES(x, x′) = 2 otherwise. Note that ES is a metric space by definition. Figure 1(a) illustrates the above
metric function, where S consists all red nodes. All edges connected to those sensitive values are  and rest of the
edges are 2. For example, in smart building, this metric function means that some locations S are more sensitive (e.g.,
restroom, smoker lounge, etc.) than the other locations (e.g., meeting room). Offering stronger privacy guarantee to
more sensitive locations can be specified using the metric ES above.
We solve the above optimization problem under ES , and compare the resulting total expected squared error with the
one of a standard -LDP frequency estimation mechanism [41] which does not take care of the heterogeneous privacy
requirements for different pairs of private values and has fixed expected squared error. The numeric results are plotted
in Figure 1 with m = 100 and |S| varies from 1 to 100. It can be seen that when the number of super sensitive values
is smaller (e.g., |S| ≤ 10), ES-LDP gives better utility; when |S| reaches 40, ES-LDP almost has the same utility as
-LDP.
(a) Illustration of metric ES (b) Varying |S|, m = 100, n = 104,  = 1.0
Figure 1: Comparison between utility under ES-LDP and under -LDP for frequency queries
3.3 One-dimensional Range Queries
We consider one-dim range queries now. A range query is specified by an interval R = [l, r] ⊆ [m], and asks for∑n
i=1 1xi∈R. When the distance between private values matters, it is natural to consider a metricE: E(x, x
′) = |x−x′|
for x, x′ ∈ [m], which means values that are closer are more sensitive to each other (it is equivalent to the local version
of line graph policy in Blowfish [27] and MetricLDP [2]). For example, when x is the age of a person, it is fine to
release the information whether a person is an adult or a kid, but the exact year or month of birth is more sensitive.
Mechanisms are developed to handle range queries under -LDP [14, 42] (more will be discussed in Section 4). The
hope is that we can achieve better utility under E-LDP by solving the problem (1).
Let Wm be the workload matrix for all possible one-dimensional range queries on [m]. We consider a strategy matrix
A = Lm (an m×m {0, 1}-matrix with bottom-left triangular area filled with 1), which intuitively means that each
user creates an LDP report for estimating every prefix sum of the frequencies (a range query can be answered as the
difference between two prefixes).
W3 =

1 0 0
1 1 0
1 1 1
0 1 0
0 1 1
0 0 1
 L3 = [1 0 01 1 0
1 1 1
]
(3)
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Above are examples of W3 and L3. With A = Lm, we can solve the problem (1) as:
min
s
2n
m∑
x=1
ms2x
s.t.
r−1∑
i=l
1
si
≤ (r − l), ∀1 ≤ l < r ≤ m
sx ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ [m]
.
We can easily derive the optimal solution to the above problem as sk = 1 for k ∈ [m− 1] and sm = 0, and thus, the
total expected squared error is 2nm(m−1)2 for m(m− 1)/2 range queries. For each range query, the squared error is
O( n2 ). This already gives an O(log
2m) improvement (indeed, under a relaxed privacy notation, E-LDP) on the utility
in comparison to the mechanisms in [14] and [42] (which have expected squared error O(n log
2m
2 ), under -LDP).
In the next section, we will continue investigating this important workload class, range queries, with two goals: i)
bounding the error per query (instead of the total error); and ii) handling D-dimensional range queries on [m]D with
error bounds independent on the domain size m.
4 Multi-dimensional Range Query and Quantile Search
We now consider the task of answering range counting queries in a D-dim domain, defined in Section 1.2: a range query
is specified by a range R = [l1, r1]× . . .× [lD, rD] ⊆ [m]D, asking for c(R) =
∑n
i=1 1xi∈R. We provide EL1-LDP
when collecting each xi.
Our results can be extended for ELp , due to the relation: ‖x‖p ≤ ‖x‖1 ≤ D1− 1p ‖x‖p for any p ≥ 1. Therefore, any
algorithm that is EL1 -LDP with parameter  is also ELp -LDP with parameter D
1− 1p .
Notations. We say that a dimension d of the range query R = [l1, r1]× · · · × [lD, rD] is trivial if [ld, rd] = [1,m], and
nontrivial otherwise. Let DR be the number of nontrivial dimensions of R.
For a value x ∈ [m]D or any vector v, we use x[i] or v[i] to denote the coordinate on the ith dimension, respectively.
We assign an index (ind : [m]D → [mD]) to each value in the D-dim domain [m]D, numbering all the values in [m]D
from 1 to mD: ind(x) = 1 +
∑D
d=1m
d−1(x[d]− 1). If it is clear from the context, we will refer to x as both a value in
[m]D and its index ind(x), interchangeably.
Comparison to existing approaches and our main results. Existing methods for answering range queries under
-LDP are either based on hierarchical histograms [14, 42] or discrete Haar transform [14]. For approaches based on
hierarchical histograms, a one-dim range query can be split into O(logm) sub-queries in a hierarchy of intervals, and
each sub-query can be answered via frequency estimation under -LDP. The expected squared error is thus O(n log
2m
2 )
(when  is small). The same idea can be extended for D-dim domain and queries with DR nontrivial dimensions, with
error O(n log
DR+Dm
2 ). Approaches based on discrete Haar transform have the same asymptotic error.
Our goal here is to remove the prohibitive (logm)O(D) term from error bounds under EL1-LDP. Both schemes
introduced above, however, rely on (logm)O(D) independent frequency estimations per query, and each frequency
estimation as a black box is inherently hard with error as least Ω( n2 ) even under EL1-LDP (consider a domain with
two possible values). And thus, the (logm)O(D) term is inevitable for existing methods even under relaxation. In
the centralized model (Blowfish privay), under the same metric EL1 , Haney et al. [26] made some improvement but
failed to completely remove the (logm)O(D) term. Their approach has expected squared error O(D(logm)
3(D−1)
2 ) under
EL1-CDP, which is only better than the Privelet mechanism [45] under -CDP by a Θ(log
3m) factor. Haney et al.
[26]’s method can be extended to the local model EL1-LDP, with error O(
nD(logm)2(D−1)
2 ), reducing the expected
squared error in the methods [14, 42] under -LDP only by a factor of Θ(log2m).
We propose an efficient mechanism with error bounded by O(n( 22 )
D) when  is small, independent on the domain size
m (Section 4.1). As  is usually chosen to be a constant (e.g., 1), 1  logm, and thus replacing log2Dm with 12D
improves the utility significantly. Our method can be considered as a special type of transformation similar to discrete
Haar transform, but with a nice property that during the summation of frequency estimations of single values, most
noise from perturbation will be canceled out. Our method naturally extends to the case where each dimension has a
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different size (Section 4.3.1), i.e., X = [m1]× · · · × [mD]. When each data owner i holds a (private) weight wi ∈W ,
a weighted range query asks cw(R) =
∑n
i=1 wi1xi∈R, which can be also handled by our method (Section 4.3.2), with
error O(n∆2( 22 )
D+1), where ∆ = maxwi∈W |wi|. Finally, we introduce how to apply our method to find quantiles
under EL1-LDP, and analyze the error (Section 4.4). It is likely that the techniques we develop can be applied in the
centralized setting [26] (Blowfish) to completely remove the (logm)O(D) error term there, but we will leave it as future
work.
4.1 Multi-dimensional Range Query under E-LDP
EL1 -LDP encoding algorithm A(x). Let x denote the D-dimensional private value held by a data owner. She first
encodes each dimension d of x, x[d] ∈ [m], into a length-m vector bd ∈ {−1, 1}m:
bd = [−1,−1, . . . ,−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
x[d]−1
, 1, 1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
m−x[d]+1
]
where the first up to the (x[d]− 1)-th position are −1’s and the rest are 1’s. She will then perturb the vector bd into rd
with standard random-flipping operation on each position k ∈ [m]:
rd[k] =
{
bd[k] with prob. e

e+1
−bd[k] with prob. 1e+1
.
The data owner reports the D ×m matrix A(x) = R = [r1, r2, ..., rD]ᵀ to the data collector.
Proposition 4. A(x) is EL1 -LDP.
Proof. To show it satisfies EL1 -LDP, we have the following for any x, x′:
Pr[A(x) = R|x]
Pr[A(x′) = R|x′] ≤
D∏
i=1
e|x[i]−x
′[i]| = e
∑D
i=1 |x[i]−x′[i]| = eE(x,x
′).
Range query estimation. After collecting data owners’ reports R1, ...,Rn, where Ri = A(xi), the data collector first
obtains a length-mD vector o = [o1, . . . , omD ]ᵀ, called observations:
ox =
n∑
i=1
D∏
d=1
Ri[d, x[d]], ∀x ∈ [m]D (4)
where R[a, b] denotes the value in row a and column b of matrix R.
Recall that the index ind : [m]D → [mD] numbers all the values in [m]D from 1 to mD, namely, ind(x) = 1 +∑D
d=1m
d−1(x[d] − 1). When referring to indexes of entries in a vector, we will use x and ind(x), interchangeably.
Thus, by ox, we mean the ind(x)-th position oind(x) in the vector o.
For example, if n = 2, D = 2 and m = 3, with R1 =
[
1 −1 1
−1 −1 −1
]
and R2 =
[
1 1 −1
1 −1 −1
]
, for x = (1, 1),
ox = R1[1, x[1]] ·R1[2, x[2]] +R2[1, x[1]] ·R2[2, x[2]] = 1 · (−1) + 1 · 1 = 0.
We will use o to estimate the frequencies of all values in [m]D. Let c = [c1, ..., cmD ]ᵀ be the vector representing true
frequencies of all values x ∈ [m]D among the n data owners.
As will be proved in Theorem 1, there exists a relation
E[o] = (
e − 1
e + 1
)DBm,D · c, (5)
where Bm,D is an mD ×mD matrix that can be partitioned into m×m submatrices Bm,D−1, satisfying the following
recursive relation for 2 ≤ d ≤ D,
Bm,d =

Bm,d−1 −Bm,d−1 · · · −Bm,d−1
...
. . . . . .
...
...
. . . −Bm,d−1
Bm,d−1 · · · · · · Bm,d−1
 (6)
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That is, after partition, the submatrices in the bottom-left triangle are all Bm,d−1 and rest of the submatrices are all
−Bm,d−1. For the base case when D = 1,
Bm,1 =

1 −1 · · · −1
...
. . . . . .
...
...
. . . −1
1 · · · · · · 1

Estimate Single-value Frequencies. The estimated frequency vector cˆ = [cˆ1, ..., cˆmD ]ᵀ can be thus computed from
(5) as follows:
cˆ = (
e + 1
e − 1)
DB−1m,D · o, (7)
For any value x ∈ [m]D, cˆx is the estimated frequency of x.
Estimate answers to range queries. For any value x ∈ [m]D, cˆx = cˆx is the frequency of x estimated as (7). For a
D-dim range query R = [l1, r1]× · · · × [lD, rD], the data collector can estimate its answer by directly summing up the
estimated frequencies of all x ∈ R, that is,
cˆ(R) =
∑
x∈R
cˆx = (
e + 1
e − 1)
D
∑
x∈R
exB
−1
m,D · o, (8)
where ex is a 0-1 row vector with only the ind(x)-th entry as 1, and exB−1m,D gives the ind(x)-th row in B
−1
m,D.
Computing B−1m,D. The rest question is thus how to compute the matrix inverse B
−1
m,D. It turns out that we can
efficiently compute it in a recursive way. B−1m,D can be partitioned into m×m submatrices B−1m,D−1, defined by the
following recursive relation for 2 ≤ d ≤ D:
B−1m,d =
1
2

B−1m,d−1 0 · · · 0 B−1m,d−1
−B−1m,d−1 B−1m,d−1
. . .
... 0
0 −B−1m,d−1
. . . 0
...
...
. . . . . . B−1m,d−1 0
0 . . . 0 −B−1m,d−1 B−1m,d−1

. (9)
Recursively, B−1m,d−1 is a m
d−1 ×md−1 matrix. In the base case, B−1m,1 is the m×m matrix:
B−1m,1 =
1
2

1 0 · · · 0 1
−1 1 . . . ... 0
0 −1 . . . 0 ...
...
. . . . . . 1 0
0 . . . 0 −1 1
 .
We will show that the estimated answer cˆ(R) is unbiased and bound its error in Section 4.2. We will also present
simulation results on accuracy and analyze the complexity of our solution.
4.2 Analysis of Algorithm
Accuracy analysis. We first show the unbiasedness of our estimations in Section 4.1.
Theorem 1. The estimates for the frequency of any single value and the answer to any range query R (Equations (7)
and (8), respectively) are unbiased, i.e., E[cˆ] = c and E[cˆ(R)] = c(R).
The proof of Theorem 1 is provided in Appendix A.3.
According to Equation (8), our mechanism estimates range query by by summing up all estimations of single values’
frequencies in the range R. Thus, it is natural to expect this approach of range query estimation to incur an expected
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squared error that is O(mD) times larger than that of a single value, since the size of the range may be as large as
O(mD). Surprisingly, however, as we will show in the following, the range query’s estimation error has the same
upper bound as the single-value frequency’s estimation error if DR = D. In contrast, existing methods for range query
estimation [14, 42] all have an amplification factor of (logm)O(D) on the expected squared error in comparison to that
of a single-value frequency. We have the following theorems on the accuracy.
Theorem 2 (Single-value frequency). For any value x ∈ [m]D, the expected squared error of estimation cˆx is
E[‖cˆx − cx‖2] = Var[cˆx] = O
(
(
e + 1
e − 1)
2D2−D(1− (e
 − 1
e + 1
)2D)n
)
.
Theorem 3 (Range query). For any range R = [l1, r1]× [l2, r2]× · · · × [lD, rD] with DR non-trivial dimensions, the
expected squared error of estimation cˆ(R) is
E[‖cˆ(R)− c(R)‖2] = Var[cˆ(R)] = O
(
(
e + 1
e − 1)
2D2−DR(1− (e
 − 1
e + 1
)2D)n
)
.
When  is small, Var[cˆx] ≈ O(( 22 )Dn), and Var[cˆ(R)] ≈ O(( 2 )2D2−DRn). The proof of Theorem 2 is provided in
Appendix A.4, and the proof of Theorem 3 is provided in Appendix A.5.
Here, let’s give some intuitive explanation on why the expected squared errors for both range query and single value
have the same upper bound (if DR = D). This is from the nice property of the bias correction matrix B−1m,D. More
specifically, when calculating the estimation for the range query in (8), the expected squared error of the estimation
is affected by the non-zero terms in
∑
x∈R exB
−1
m,D, which is a summation of multiple rows of B
−1
m,D with each row
corresponding to one point in R. Fortunately, we can show that instead of exploding the number of non-zero terms
in the summation by O(|R|), most of the terms are canceled out, leaving the number of remaining non-zero terms to
be equal to that in a single-value frequency query. Therefore, the expected squared error is not amplified from single
values to range queries. More details can be found in our proof in Appendix A.5.
Notice that there is still a O(2D−DR) gap between the analyzed bounds for Var[cˆ(R)] and Var[cˆx] when DR < D.
This gap can be easily removed by slightly changing our mechanism mentioned in Section 4.1, which leads to DR = D.
To enforce DR = D for any range query, we can extend the domain size m of each dimension by adding one dummy
value, i.e., changing the domain [m] to [m+ 1] for each dimension, even though no data point will lie in the extended
extra space. Then, any range query in the original space [m]D will have DR = D since every dimension of the range is
nontrivial in the extended space [m+ 1]D, which leads to Var[cˆ(R)] = Var[cˆx].
Simulation results. We perform a simple simulation to evaluate the empirical error of our mechanism and verify our
theoretical analysis (Theorems 2 and 3). We use synthetic data generated as follows. For any D-dimensional private
value, each of its dimension follows Zipf distribution with parameter 1.1. We implement our mechanism in Section 4.1
and measure the average squared error of frequency queries over all single values. We also randomly generate 100
range queries and measure the average squared error of all these range queries. The mechanism (both encoding and
estimation) is repeated three times. The analyzed error bound is the one presented in Theorem 2 (with the constant
set to be 1 in the big oh, it is equal to the analytical upper bound as shown in the proof). As we can observe from the
Figure 2, both the empirical squared errors of single-value frequencies and range queries are below our analyzed error
bound (Theorem 2), proving the effectiveness of our mechanism.
(a) D = 5, n = 1000, and m = 10 (b) D = 6, n = 1000, and m = 10
Figure 2: Squared error in estimating single-value frequencies and multi-dimensional range queries
Computational and space complexity. Each data owner will compute and send D vectors of length m to the data
collector, leading to computational/space complexity O(mD).
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For the data collector, in order to obtain the frequency estimation vector cˆ = ( e
+1
e−1 )
DB−1m,D · o, both B−1m,D and o need
to be computed. Since o is a vector of size mD and computing each entry requires O(nD) time, the computational
complexity for computing o is O(DmDn). The computation of B−1m,D can be done via the recursion in Equation (9).
By the argument in the proof of Theorem 2, each row ofB−1m,D has only 2
D non-zero elements, and therefore computing
frequency estimation for any value x requires O(2D) time. Then computing every value in the range [m]D requires
O(2DmD) = O((2m)D) time. There are three different implementations for the rest steps.
• (store single-value frequencies): We can store frequency estimations for all values in [m]D with O(mD) space,
and answer a query R by summing up cˆx’s for all x ∈ R with O(|R|) time.
• (store all prefix sums): In addition, we can compute and store all the O(mD) multi-dimensional prefix sums.
A range query can be answered by combining O(2D) answers of the prefix sums.
• (on-the-fly): Alternatively, we can skip the above preprocessing, and compute the answer for a range query on
the fly. In this case, we need O(Dmn) to store all data owners’ reports and O(max(DmDn, 2D|R|)) time
(computing o and |R| frequency estimations) to process a query.
We summarize the computational and space costs for the data collector in Table 1.
Table 1: Summary of the computational and space costs of the data collector in different implementations
store single-value frequencies store all prefix sums on-the-fly
space cost O(mD) O(mD) O(Dmn)
preprocessing O(max(DmDn, (2m)D)) O(max(DmDn, (2m)D)) O(1)
query cost O(|R|) O(2D) O(max(DmDn, 2D|R|))
Handling continuous domains. In general, the input may be vectors from a real domain [0,Σ]D. To apply the
mechanism introduced in this section, a mapping from [0,Σ]D to [m]D is needed (e.g., partitioning each dimension
[0,Σ] evenly into sub-intervals and mapping each of them to a value in [m]). At first glance, it is appealing to choose a
larger m for such a discretization process, since the truncation error (due to the rounding from [0,Σ] to [m]) can be
smaller as a more accurate range in [m] can be used for the range query in [0,Σ], while the error bounds in Theorems 2
and 3 are independent on m. However, a larger m means the “real” distance between i and i+ 1 in [m] is smaller in the
original domain [0,Σ], and thus a smaller  is needed to guarantee the same level of privacy protection, resulting in a
larger estimation error according to Theorems 2 and 3. Therefore, it is possible to choose an optimal value of m to
minimize the total error of the two types introduced above. The optimal selection of m may depend on the distribution
of the input data, which is hard to be quantified, and is private, too. We leave it as an open question for future work.
4.3 Extensions to More Complex Range Queries
We introduce how our mechanism can be extended for more complex range queries: i) when each dimension has a
different domain size; and ii) weighted range queries.
4.3.1 When Dimension Sizes are Different
Our mechanism in Section 4.1 naturally extends to the case where each dimension has a different size, i.e., the private
values are in domain [m1]× . . .× [mD]. We use similar notations as in Section 4.1, and we also assign an index to a
value in the domain: ind(x) = 1 +
∑D
d=1((
∏d
j=1mj−1)(x[d]− 1)) where m0 = 1. If it is clear from the context, we
will use x to also denote its index ind(x).
Each data owner sends to the data collector D vectors R = [r1, ..., rD]
ᵀ, where each rd for dimension d is a length-md
vector constructed the same way as in Section 4.1.
After collecting data owners’ responses R1, ...,Rn, the data collector similarly calculates an observation vector of
length
∏D
j=1mj as
ox =
n∑
i=1
D∏
d=1
Ri[d, x[d]], ∀x ∈ [m1]× . . .× [mD]
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where Ri[d, x[d]] denotes rd[x[d]] for Ri = [r1, ..., rD]
ᵀ. Then the data collector can estimate the frequencies of all
single values in [m1]× . . .× [mD] as a vector
cˆ = (
e + 1
e − 1)
DC−1D · o
where C−1D is a (
∏D
j=1mj)× (
∏D
j=1mj) matrix that can be partitioned into mD ×mD submatrices, defined by the
following recursive relation for 2 ≤ k ≤ D:
C−1k =
1
2

C−1k−1 0 · · · 0 C−1k−1
−C−1k−1 C−1k−1
. . .
... 0
0 −C−1k−1
. . . 0
...
...
. . . . . . C−1k−1 0
0 . . . 0 −C−1k−1 C−1k−1

, C−11 =
1
2

1 0 · · · 0 1
−1 1 . . . ... 0
0 −1 . . . 0 ...
...
. . . . . . 1 0
0 . . . 0 −1 1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
m1
.
C−1k−1 is a (
∏k−1
j=1 mj)× (
∏k−1
j=1 mj) matrix. For the base case, C
−1
1 is the above m1 ×m1 matrix.
Let R = [l1, r1]× [l2, r2]× · · · × [lD, rD] be the range for a range query. We can similarly obtain the answer for the
range query by directly summing up the frequencies of all x ∈ R, that is,
cˆ(R) =
∑
x∈R
cˆx = (
e + 1
e − 1)
D
∑
x∈R
exC
−1
D · o (10)
The correctness proof and accuracy analysis are similar to the case with identical domain sizes. The error bounds of the
estimations are identical to the bounds in Theorems 2 and 3.
4.3.2 Weighted Range Queries
When each data owner i also holds a (private) weight wi ∈W , a weighted range query asks cw(R) =
∑n
i=1 wi1xi∈R.
Without loss of generality, we consider weights from the domain W = [0,∆], where ∆ is public knowledge, as we
can shift other intervals with finite lengths to this domain by adding constants. Two cases are considered below, for
non-private and private weights, respectively.
If the weights are non-private information, results for unweighted multi-dimension range query can be easily
extended to weighted multi-dimensional range query. All data owners are partitioned into groups by their weights, and
each group is formed by data owners that has identical weights. For each group gw with weight w, we construct an
estimator for unweighted multi-dimensional range queries cˆgw(·). To answer a weighted range query, we sum up the
weighted answers from all groups,
cˆw(R) =
∑
w∈W
w · cˆgw(R).
If the weights are private information, we can consider the weight as an extra private dimension for each data owner,
and then use unweighted (D + 1)-dimensional range query oracle to answer weighted D-dimensional range queries.
More specifically, given weights w = [w1, . . . , wn] for n data owners, each owner i first rounds her private weight wi
to {1, 2}: to 2 with probability wi∆ and to 1 with probability ∆−wi∆ . The rounded private weight is considered to be the
(D + 1)-th private dimension with domain {1, 2}. The same encoding algorithm in Section 4.1 is used. For the data
collector, we construct an estimator cˆ(·) for unweighted (D + 1)-dim range queries, and estimate the answer to the
weighted range query with R = [l1, r1]× · · · × [lD, rD] as
cˆw(R) = ∆ · cˆ(R× [2, 2]).
The estimation is unbiased since E[cˆw(R)] = E[∆ · cˆ(R× [2, 2])] = ∆ ·E[cˆ(R× [2, 2])] = ∆ ·
∑
i∈[n](
xi
∆ · 1xi∈R) =∑
i∈[n] xi1xi∈R. Error in these two cases can be bounded as follows.
Theorem 4. For weighted multi-dimensional range query with any range R = [l1, r1] × [l2, r2] × · · · × [lD, rD] of
dimension DR, the expected squared error (variance) of estimation cˆw(R) is
1. (non-private weights) E[‖cˆw(R)− cw(R)‖2] = O(( e+1e−1 )2D2−DR(1− ( e
−1
e+1 )
2D)∆2n), or
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2. (private weights) E[‖cˆw(R)− cw(R)‖2] = O(( e+1e−1 )2(D+1)2−(DR+1)(1− ( e
−1
e+1 )
2(D+1))∆2n).
The proof of Theorem 4 is in Appendix A.6. The same technique of extending each dimension by a dummy element
mentioned in Section 4.2 can be applied to replace DR with D in the bounds.
4.4 Application: Quantile Queries
Consider quantile queries in a one-dim domain X = [m]. The percentile of a value x in X = {xi}i∈[n] is σ(x) =
1
n
∑n
i=1 1xi≤x, which calculates the fraction of values that are no larger than x in X . The interval I(x) = (σ(x −
1), σ(x)] ⊆ [0, 1] is said to be the percentile interval of x. The p-quantile of X is defined to be the value x∗, such
that σ(x∗ − 1) < p ≤ σ(x∗), i.e., p is in x∗’s percentile interval. Note that median estimation is a special case of the
quantile query when p = 0.5.
Let xˆ∗ be an estimated p-quantile. The goal is to make sure that p is close to I(xˆ∗) (or, the percentile of xˆ∗ is close to
p). We define the error of the estimation xˆ∗ to be
Err[xˆ∗] = inf
pˆ∈I(xˆ∗)
|pˆ− p|.
We want to bound error Err[xˆ∗] with high probability. Note that our error definition is essentially the -approximate
p-quantile in literature, e.g., [35] (with inf considered here as X is a multiset).
Answering quantile queries under EL1 -LDP. We consider the metric EL1 defined for range queries. Our mechanism
of quantile query estimation basically follows the approach proposed in Section 4.7 of [14], which uses one-dimensional
range query mechanism as a primitive and perform binary search to estimate the p-quantile. Our main contribution here
is to provide formal analysis on the utility of the mechanism, and compare the mechanisms under -LDP and EL1 -LDP.
For data owners, private values are encoded using the algorithm (its 1-dim case) in Section 4.1 to guarantee EL1 . For
the data collector, let cˆ([l, r]) be the frequency of range [l, r] estimated using the mechanism introduced in Section 4.1
for answering one-dim range queries. We can then estimate the percentile of value x as σˆ(x) = cˆ([1, x])/n. Our
mechanism answers a p-quantile query as follows.
1. Construct an oracle (Section 4.1) for answering 1-dim range queries on data owners’ reports.
2. Perform binary search on the input data domain [m] until a value xˆ∗ s.t. σˆ(xˆ∗ − 1) < p ≤ σˆ(xˆ∗) is found,
with σˆ defined above. More specifically, initially let L = 1, R = m and M = d(L + R)/2e. If σˆ(M) < p,
then let L = M , otherwise let R = M . Let M = d(L+R)/2e and repeat the above procedure until find the
value xˆ∗ (if R− L ≤ 10, we perform a linear-scan search for xˆ∗).
3. Output xˆ∗ as the estimation for the quantile query.
Accuracy analysis. We show that, with high probability, the estimation error Err[xˆ∗] is bounded.
Lemma 1. With probability at least 1− δ, the error of estimated percentile is bounded
|σˆ(x)− σ(x)| ≤ e
 + 1
e − 1 ·
√
2
n
log
1
δ
, for any x ∈ [m].
Theorem 5. With probability at least 1− δ, our quantile query mechanism guarantees that
Err[xˆ∗] ≤ 2(e
 + 1)
e − 1 ·
√
2
n
log
2 logm
δ
, for an estimated p-quantile xˆ∗.
The proofs of Lemma 1 and Theorem 5 are in Appendix A.7 and Appendix A.8, respectively.
Comparison with the mechanism under -LDP. From Theorem 5, the estimation error of our mechanism is bounded
by O( 1

√
n
√
log logm) with high probability. The state-of-the-art -LDP mechanisms [14, 42] for one-dim range
queries can be plugged in step 1 (as suggested in [14]). Since these primitives have error bounded by O( 1

√
n
logm)
with high probability for estimating percentiles, following the same argument, the error of the p-quantile estimation is
O( 1

√
n
logm
√
log logm), which is O(logm) times larger compared to our mechanism under EL1 -LDP.
5 Conclusion
This paper investigates local differential privacy on metric spaces (or E-LDP), which is a relaxation of -LDP to
customize the levels of indistinguishability among different pairs of values using a metric function E. In this work,
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Table 2: Summary of error in EL1 -LDP algorithms and -LDP algorithms for different tasks ( is small)
1-dim range query Multi-dim range query Quantile query
(expected squared error) (expected squared error) (error w.h.p.)
[14, 42] (-LDP) O(n logm2 ) O(
n(logm)D+DR
2 ) O(
logm

√
n
√
log logm)
Extending [26] (EL1 -LDP) O( n2 ) O(
nD(logm)2(D−1)
2 ) ?
This work (EL1 -LDP) O( n2 ) O(n(
2
 )
2D2−DR) O( 1

√
n
√
log logm)
we design a generic E-LDP mechanism (generalizing matrix mechanisms in CDP) to trade-off privacy for utility of
linear counting queries. For multi-dimensional range queries, we introduce a novel E-LDP algorithm under L1-metric
with an error which is independent on the size m of each dimension. This technique can also help reduce the error of
-LDP algorithms for quantile queries by a factor of logm under E-LDP. Our techniques apply to Lp-LDP as well. As
future work, we would apply techniques in this paper as primitives for other analytical tasks; we would also expect the
transform matrices developed in this paper to be used to improve algorithms in the centralized setting under similar
relaxations (e.g., in Blowfish privacy).
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A Missing Proofs
A.1 Proof for Proposition 1
Clearly E(x, x) = 0 and E(x, x′) = E(x′, x). Now we show the triangle inequality. We want to show that, if for some
x, y, z ∈ X , E(x, z) > E(x, y) + E(y, z), then E is not tight. By definition
Pr[A(x) ∈ S]
Pr[A(z) ∈ S] =
Pr[A(x) ∈ S]
Pr[A(y) ∈ S] ·
Pr[A(y) ∈ S]
Pr[A(z) ∈ S] ≤ e
E(x,y)+E(y,z) < eE(x,z)
which shows E is not tight for A. Therefore for any tight policy E, we have E(x, z) ≤ E(x, y) + E(y, z). 
A.2 Proof for Proposition 3
E[qˆ(Xˆ)] = E[B ·∑ni=1 ri] = E[B ·∑ni=1(A · hx + Lap(s))] = W∑ni=1 hx + E[B ·∑ni=1 Lap(s)] = W · c,
therefore the estimation is unbiased.
To show the variance of the estimation, we have E[‖qˆ(Xˆ) −W · c‖2] = E[‖B ·∑ni=1 Lap(s)‖2] = Trace[B ·
Var[
∑n
i=1 Lap(s)] ·Bᵀ] = 2n · Trace[BᵀB · diag(s21, . . . , s2p)]. The last equality is due to the property of Laplace
distribution, Var[Lap(s)] = 2diag(s21, . . . , s
2
p). 
A.3 Proof for Theorem 1
We will first show that the estimate for the frequency of all values among the n users is unbiased i.e., E[cˆ] = c, where
cˆ = ( e
+1
e−1 )
DB−1m,D · o, where o is a vector of observations defined by Eqn. 4 and B−1m,D is a bias correction matrix
defined by Eqn. 9. Since the answer for a range query is the sum of a set of unbiased estimates, it is also unbiased.
Given the input xi held by user i, the encoding of the d-th dimension of xi before perturbation is a m-length vector,
bd ∈ {−1, 1}m, where the first (v − 1) bits are -1 and the rest are 1 if xi[d] = v. The perturbation algorithm flips
these bits independently with probability p = 11+e and results a new vector rd, i.e., Pr[rd[k]← bd[k]] = 1− p and
Pr[rd[k]← (−1 · bd[k])] = p, for every k ∈ [m]. Then the report matrix Ri = [r1, r2, ..., rD]ᵀ is sent by user i to the
data collector. The observation for x ∈ [m]D is ox =
∑n
i=1
∏D
d=1Ri[d, x[d]].
Let’s analyze the expected value for the contribution of each user i in ox, i.e.,
∏D
d=1Ri[d, x[d]]. Before perturbation, the
corresponding product is
∏D
d=1 bd[x[d]]. Note that if xi[d] > x[d], then bd[x[d]] = −1. Hence, this product depends
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only on the number of the coordinates of xi which have larger value than x, denoted by S>(xi, x) =
∑D
d=1 1xi[d]>x[d].
Hence, we have
∏D
d=1 bd[x[d]] = (−1)S>(xi,x). Now consider how the above product changes after perturbation.
Since each position of the vector b is {−1, 1}, flipping even number of the positions in x[1], ..., x[D] will not change
the product. Hence, with probability Peven =
∑
i∈[0,D],i even
(
D
i
)
pi(1− p)D−i, we have
D∏
d=1
Ri[d, x[d]] =
D∏
d=1
bd[x[d]] = (−1)S>(xi,x);
and with probability Podd =
∑
i∈[0,D],i odd
(
D
i
)
pi(1− p)D−i, we have
D∏
d=1
Ri[d, x[d]] = −
D∏
d=1
bd[x[d]] = (−1) · (−1)S>(xi,x).
Therefore, E[
∏D
d=1Ri[d, x[d]]] = (Peven − Podd)(−1)S>(xi,x) = (1− 2p)D(−1)S>(xi,x). The last equality is due to
the fact that the expansion of ((1− p)− p)D equals to Peven − Podd.
When aggregating all users’ contributions, we have
E[ox] =
n∑
i=1
E[
D∏
d=1
Ri[d, x[d]]] = (1− 2p)D
n∑
i=1
(−1)S>(xi,x) = (1− 2p)D
mD∑
x′=1
(−1)S>(x′,x)cx′
The last equality is simply by changing iterating data owners’ value to iterating values in the D-dim domain. Thus, by
the above derivation, we obtained a linear transformation from the frequency vector c = [c1, ..., cmD ] to the observed
vector o = [o1, ..., omD ], characterized by a mD ×mD matrix Am,D = (1 − 2p)DBm,D, where Bm,D is a matrix
whose elements are either −1 or 1.
Therefore, the relation can be written as E[o] = (1 − 2p)DBm,D · c where p = 11+e . Together with Lemma 2, the
estimate cˆ = ( e
+1
e−1 )
DB−1m,D · o for c is unbiased. 
Lemma 2. The matrix B−1m,D defined by Equation (9) in Section 4.1 is the matrix inverse of Bm,D.
Proof. It can be observed that Bm,D can be partitioned into m ×m submatrices Bm,D−1, satisfying the following
recursive relation for 2 ≤ d ≤ D,
Bm,d =

Bm,d−1 −Bm,d−1 · · · −Bm,d−1
...
. . . . . .
...
...
. . . −Bm,d−1
Bm,d−1 · · · · · · Bm,d−1

That is, after partition, the submatrices in the bottom-left triangle are all Bm,d−1 and rest of the submatrices are all
−Bm,d−1. For the base case when D = 1,
Bm,1 =

1 −1 · · · −1
...
. . . . . .
...
...
. . . −1
1 · · · · · · 1

Recall that B−1m,D is defined by the following recursive relation in Eqn. 9: for 2 ≤ d ≤ D,
B−1m,d =
1
2

B−1m,d−1 0 · · · 0 B−1m,d−1
−B−1m,d−1 B−1m,d−1
. . .
... 0
0 −B−1m,d−1
. . . 0
...
...
. . . . . . B−1m,d−1 0
0 . . . 0 −B−1m,d−1 B−1m,d−1

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where B−1m,d−1 is a m
d−1 ×md−1 submatrix. For the base case, B−1m,1 is the following m×m matrix
B−1m,1 =
1
2

1 0 · · · 0 1
−1 1 . . . ... 0
0 −1 . . . 0 ...
...
. . . . . . 1 0
0 . . . 0 −1 1

One can easily verify that Bm,dB−1m,d = diag(Imd−1 , ..., Imd−1) = Imd for any 1 ≤ d ≤ D, and thus B−1m,D defined
by Eqn. 9 is the matrix inverse of Bm,D.
A.4 Proof for Theorem 2
First we claim that each row of the matrix B−1m,D has 2
D elements, and each element is either −( 12 )D or ( 12 )D. We can
prove the claim by induction.
First consider the base case when D = 1,
B−1m,1 =
1
2

1 0 · · · 0 1
−1 1 . . . ... 0
0 −1 . . . 0 ...
...
. . . . . . 1 0
0 . . . 0 −1 1

Thus the claim is true for D = 1.
Suppose the claim is true for D = k, namely each row of the matrix B−1m,k has 2
k elements, and each element is −( 12 )k
or ( 12 )
k. Now we consider the case when D = k + 1. According to Equation (9), we have
B−1m,k+1 =
1
2

B−1m,k 0 · · · 0 B−1m,k
−B−1m,k B−1m,k
. . .
... 0
0 −B−1m,k
. . . 0
...
...
. . . . . . B−1m,k 0
0 . . . 0 −B−1m,k B−1m,k

Notice that each row of the matrix B−1m,k+1 consists values from the rows of the two submatrices B
−1
m,k and −B−1m,k,
which by induction assumption has 2k elements from {−( 12 )k, ( 12 )k}. Thus, each row of B−1m,k+1 has 2k+1 elements,
and each element is −( 12 )k+1 or ( 12 )k+1. Therefore, the claim is true for any D.
Now we can prove the theorem. According to Equation (7), cˆx = ( e
+1
e−1 )
D(ex ·B−1m,D) · o, where ex denotes a binary
vector with x-th position being 1, thus ex ·B−1m,D computes the x-th row of matrix B−1m,D. Therefore the variance can
be computed as
Var[cˆx] = (
e + 1
e − 1)
2DVar[(exB
−1
m,D) · o]
With the claim that each row of the matrix B−1m,D has 2
D elements, and each element is either −( 12 )D or ( 12 )D, we
obtain
Var[cˆx] ≤ (e
 + 1
e − 1)
2D · 2D(1
2
)2D ·max
x
(Var[ox]) = (
e + 1
e − 1)
2D · 2−D ·max
x
(Var[ox])
Recall that by Eqn. 4 and the proof of Theorem 1,
ox =
n∑
i=1
D∏
d=1
Ri[d, x[d]]
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where
∏D
d=1Ri[d, x[d]] = (−1)S>(xi,x) with probability Peven(D), and
∏D
d=1Ri[d, x[d]] = (−1) · (−1)S>(xi,x)
with probability Podd(D). Thus, E[ox]2 = n(Podd(D) − Peven(D))2 = n(1 − 2p)2D = n( e−1e+1 )2D, and E[o2x] =
n(Podd(D) + Peven(D)) = n. We can calculate the variance as
Var[ox] = E[o
2
x]− E[ox]2 = (1− (
e − 1
e + 1
)2D)n
which leads to
Var[cˆx] = O
(
(
e + 1
e − 1)
2D2−D(1− (e
 − 1
e + 1
)2D)n
)
.

A.5 Proof for Theorem 3
According to Equation (8), we have cˆ(R) =
∑
x∈R cˆx = (
e+1
e−1 )
D
∑
x∈R((exB
−1
m,D) · o) =
( e
+1
e−1 )
D(
∑
x∈R(exB
−1
m,D)) · o, where exB−1m,D is the x-th row of matrix B−1m,D. We first examine the non-zero
entries of
∑
x∈R(exB
−1
m,D), which we denote as N (
∑
x∈R(exB
−1
m,D)).
Recall that by Equation (9),
B−1m,D =
1
2

B−1m,D−1 0 · · · 0 B−1m,D−1
−B−1m,D−1 B−1m,D−1
. . .
... 0
0 −B−1m,D−1
. . . 0
...
...
. . . . . . B−1m,D−1 0
0 . . . 0 −B−1m,D−1 B−1m,D−1

Let [B−1m,D]k denote the k-th row of B
−1
m,D after partitioning into submatrices. For instance, [B
−1
m,D]1 =
[B−1m,D−1, 0, ..., 0,B
−1
m,D−1], [B
−1
m,D]2 = [−B−1m,D−1,B−1m,D−1, 0, ..., 0]. Then
∑
x∈R
(exB
−1
m,D) =
∑
x′∈R/[lD,rD]
ex′
rD∑
k=lD
[B−1m,D]k
where R/[lD, rD] = [l1, r1]× · · · × [lD−1, rD−1]. Notice that
∑rD
k=lD
[B−1m,D]k has only 1 or 2 submatrices remaining,
since many submatrices will be canceled after summation. More specifically,
t∑
k=1
[B−1m,D]k =
1
2
[0, ..., 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
t−1
,B−1m,D−1, 0, ..., 0,B
−1
m,D−1], t = 1, ...,m− 1,
m∑
k=1
[B−1m,D]k =
1
2
[0, ..., 0, 2B−1m,D−1], and
t∑
k=s
[B−1m,D]k =
1
2
[0, ..., 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
s−2
,−B−1m,D−1, 0, ..., 0,B−1m,D−1, 0, ..., 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
m−t
], 2 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ m.
Thus
∑rD
k=lD
[B−1m,D]k only consists submatrices B
−1
m,D−1 or −B−1m,D−1, and the non-zero entries of
∑
x∈R
(exB
−1
m,D) =
∑
x′∈R/[lD,rD]
ex′
rD∑
k=lD
[B−1m,D]k
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can be written as (denoted by N (·)):
N (
∑
x∈R
(exB
−1
m,D) =
N (
∑
x′∈R/[lD,rD]
ex′B
−1
m,D−1) if lD = 1 and rD = m
1
2
[N (
∑
x′∈R/[lD,rD]
ex′B
−1
m,D−1),N (
∑
x′∈R/[lD,rD]
ex′B
−1
m,D−1)] if lD = 1 and rD ≤ m− 1
1
2
[−N (
∑
x′∈R/[lD,rD]
ex′B
−1
m,D−1),N (
∑
x′∈R/[lD,rD]
ex′B
−1
m,D−1)] otherwise
.
By induction, we can obtain the expression for N (∑x∈R exB−1m,D) when R is given. Notice that if a dimension d is
trivial, i.e., [ld, rd] = [1,m], then the non-zero entries remain the same during the recursion form dimension d− 1 to d.
For the base case, we have
B−1m,1 =
1
2

1 0 · · · 0 1
−1 1 . . . ... 0
0 −1 . . . 0 ...
...
. . . . . . 1 0
0 . . . 0 −1 1

Thus,N (∑x∈[l1,r1] exB−1m,1) = [1], 12 [1 1] or 12 [−1 1]. By induction, we can easily observe that there are 2DR non-zero
entries in
∑
x∈R exB
−1
m,D, and each entry is either 2
−DR or −2−DR where DR is the dimension of R. This is true for
the base case, and remains true during the recursive relation above.
Therefore, by cˆ(R) = ( e
+1
e−1 )
D(
∑
x∈R exB
−1
m,D) · o, we have
Var[cˆ(R)] ≤ (e
 + 1
e − 1)
2D2DR(2−DR)2 max
x
(Var[ox]) = (
e + 1
e − 1)
2D2−DR max
x
(Var[ox])
Together with the conclusion from the proof of Theorem 2 that Var[ox] = O((1− ( e−1e+1 )2D)n), we have
Var[cˆ(R)] = O
(
(
e + 1
e − 1)
2D2−DR(1− (e
 − 1
e + 1
)2D)n
)
.

A.6 Proof for Theorem 4
When the weights are non-private, as mentioned we can estimate the range query as cˆw(R) =
∑
w∈W w · cˆgw(R).
Therefore, the expected squared error is
E[‖cˆw(R)− cw(R)‖2] =Var[cˆw(R)] =
∑
w∈W
w2 ·Var[cˆgw(R)]
≤∆2
∑
w∈W
(
e + 1
e − 1)
2D2−DR(1− (e
 − 1
e + 1
)2D) · |gw|
=O
(
e + 1
e − 1)
2D2−DR(1− (e
 − 1
e + 1
)2D)∆2n
)
When the weights are private, we estimate cw(R) as cˆw(R) = ∆ · cˆ(R× [2, 2]), where the (D+ 1)-th dimension is the
weight after randomized rounding (to {1, 2}). The squared error is
E[‖cˆw(R)− cw(R)‖2] =Var[cˆw(R)]
=Var[∆ · cˆ(R× [2, 2])]
=∆2 ·Var[cˆ(R× [2, 2])]
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Now consider Var[cˆ(R × [2, 2])]. We will follow similar arguments as in Appendix A.5. Given a private value xi
and weight wi held by user i, the encoding of the d-th dimension of xi before perturbation is bd ∈ {−1, 1}m, where
the first (v − 1) bits are −1 and the rest are 1 if xi[d] = v. Let w′i ∈ {1, 2} be the weight value after rounding. The
encoding of the (D + 1)-th dimension is a length-2 vector bD+1 = [1 1] if w′i = 0 and bD+1 = [−1 1] if w′i = 1.
Hence, we have
∏D+1
d=1 bd[x
+[d]] = (−1)S>(xi,x) for a (D+ 1)-dim value x+ = [x 2], since bD+1[2] = 1. Then after
perturbation, we have
∏D+1
d=1 Ri[d, x
+[d]] = (−1)S>(xi,x) with probability
Peven(D + 1) =
∑
i∈[0,D+1],i is even
(
D + 1
i
)
pi(1− p)D+1−i
where p = 1e+1 , and
∏D+1
d=1 Ri[d, x
+[d]] = (−1) · (−1)S>(xi,x) with probability
Podd(D + 1) =
∑
i∈[0,D+1],i is odd
(
D + 1
i
)
pi(1− p)D+1−i.
According to ox =
∑n
i=1
∏D+1
d=1 Ri[d, x[d]], consider the (D + 1)-dim value [x 2], we have
Var[o[x 2]] = E[o
2
[x 2]]− E[o[x 2]]2
= n(Podd(D + 1) + Peven(D + 1))− n(Podd(D + 1)− Peven(D + 1))2
= (1− (e
 − 1
e + 1
)2(D+1))n.
The rest of the proof follows the proof for Theorem 3, by changing dimension D to D + 1 and DR to DR + 1 due to
the private weight dimension. Thus,
Var[cˆ(R× [2, 2])] = (e
 + 1
e − 1)
2(D+1)2−(DR+1) ·max
x∈R
(Var[o[x 2]])
= O
(
(
e + 1
e − 1)
2(D+1)2−(DR+1)(1− (e
 − 1
e + 1
)2(D+1))n
)
,
and
E[‖cˆw(R)− cw(R)‖2] = ∆2 ·Var[cˆ(R× [2, 2])]
= O
(
(
e + 1
e − 1)
2(D+1)2−(DR+1)(1− (e
 − 1
e + 1
)2(D+1))∆2n
)
.

A.7 Proof for Lemma 1
Recall that by Equation (8), our one-dimensional range query is estimated as cˆ(R) = cˆ([1, r]) = e
+1
e−1
∑
x∈[1,r] exB
−1
m,1·
o = e
+1
e−1 (o1 + or)/2, where ox =
∑n
i=1
∏D
d=1Ri[d, x[d]],∀x ∈ [m]D. Since ox is the summation of n independent
random variables
∏D
d=1Ri[d, x[d]] ∈ {−1, 1} , by Chernoff-Hoeffding bound [[8], Theorem 2.8],
Pr [|ox − E[ox] | ≥ t] ≤ e− t
2
2n
Since σˆ(r) = e
+1
e−1 · o1+or2n , we have
Pr
[
|σˆ(r)− E(σˆ(r))| ≥ e
 + 1
e − 1 ·
t
n
]
≤ e− t
2
2n
Let δ = e−
t2
2n , then t =
√
2n log 1δ . Thus, for each frequency estimation for range [1, r], with probability ≥ 1− δ, we
have |σˆ(r)− σ(r)| ≤ e+1e−1 ·
√
2
n log
1
δ . 
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A.8 Proof for Theorem 5
Let ∆ = e
+1
e−1 ·
√
2
n log
2 logm
δ . We want to show that, w.h.p., Err[xˆ
∗] ≤ 2∆.
By Lemma 1, for a particular value x, with probability at least 1− δ2 logm , |σˆ(x)− σ(x)| ≤ ∆.
We first want to show that the binary search procedure runs in the desired way (w.h.p.), which needs to have σˆ(L) ≤ σˆ(R)
(while σ(L) ≤ σ(R) by definitions). As L and R are getting closer to each other, if in any iteration of the algorithm, we
have |σ(L)− σ(R)| ≤ 2∆, then reporting any value between L and R as xˆ∗ has the error bounded in the required way.
Before that happened, an loop invariant of the algorithm is (w.h.p.): σˆ(L) ≤ σ(L) + ∆ < p ≤ σ(R) −∆ ≤ σˆ(R),
and it relies on the events |σˆ(L)− σ(L)| ≤ ∆ and |σˆ(R)− σ(R)| ≤ ∆, each of which holds with probability at least
1− δ/(2 logm). Since the binary search procedure touches at most 2 logm such L’s and R’s, it runs in the desired way
with probability at least 1− δ (when all these events hold).
Let V be the multiset of values that are queried by the one-dimensional range query oracle in our mechanism. Since
we are using binary search, |V | ≤ 2 logm. For each x ∈ V , with probability at least 1− δ2 logm , |σˆ(x)− σ(x)| ≤ ∆.
Thus, with probability at least 1 − δ, we have |σˆ(x) − σ(x)| ≤ ∆ for all x ∈ V . As the aforementioned L’s and
R’s are also in the set V , the event that the binary search procedure runs in the desired way holds at the same time.
xˆ∗ must come from V . We can make the following argument, w.h.p.: for any x ∈ V s.t. σ(x) + ∆ < p, we have
σˆ(x) ≤ σ(x) + ∆ < p, and thus x will not be chosen by our mechanism; for any x ∈ V s.t. p ≤ σ(x − 1) − ∆,
we have p ≤ σ(x − 1) −∆ ≤ σˆ(x − 1), and thus x will not be chosen by our mechanism, either. Therefore, with
probability at least 1− δ, the error of the chosen xˆ∗ as an estimated p-quantile can be bounded as
Err[xˆ∗] = inf
pˆ∈I(xˆ∗)
|pˆ− p|
≤min(|σ(xˆ∗ − 1)− p|, |σ(xˆ∗)− p|)
≤min(∆,∆) ≤ 2∆.

B Sequential Composability of E-LDP
Similar to DP and LDP, E-LDP also has the following sequential composability.
Proposition 5 (Composition). Suppose a randomized algorithm A1 : X → Y1 satisfies E1-LDP, and A2 : X → Y2
satisfies E2-LDP. If A1,A2 have independent source of randomness, then the composition of A1,A2, defined to be A3 :
X → Y1 × Y2 by the mapping A3(x) = (A1(x),A2(x)) satisfies E3-LDP, where E3(x, x′) = E1(x, x′) + E2(x, x′)
for any pair of x, x′ ∈ X .
Proof. Consider any x, x′ ∈ X . For any (y1, y2) ∈ Y1 × Y2, we have
Pr[A3(x) = (y1, y2)]
Pr[A3(x′) = (y1, y2)] =
Pr[A1(x) = y1] Pr[A2(x) = y2]
Pr[A1(x′) = y1] Pr[A2(x′) = y2] ≤ e
E1(x,x
′)eE2(x,x
′) = eE3(x,x
′).
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